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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.

No. 920141
Priority 2

TRACY EUGENE SMITH,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction to review the decision of the
District Court pursuant to Section 78-2-2 (3) (i), U.C.A.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Was Defendant denied state and federal Due Process of law
during the sentencing phase of his conviction for capital murder
in the first degree by the alteration of the conditional plea
agreement when the lower court recommended a twenty-year minimum
sentence?
APPLICABLE STATUTES TO THIS APPEAL
Amendment 5, United States Constitution:
...No person shall be deprived of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law....
Article 1, Section 7, Constitution of Utah:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law.
Rule 11 - Pleas.

Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
-1-

(Code of 1988) .
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of
guilty or no contest and shall not accept such a plea
until the court has made the findings:
(1) That if the defendant is not represented
by counsel he has knowingly waived his right to
counsel and does not desire counsel;
(2) That the plea is voluntarily made;
(3) That the defendant knows he has rights
against compulsory self-incrimination, to a jury
trial and to confront and cross-examine in open
court the witnesses against him, and that by
entering the plea he waives all of those rights;
(4) That the defendant understands the nature
and elements of the offense to which he is
entering the plea; that upon trial the prosecution
would have the burden of proving each of those
elements beyond a reasonable doubt; and that the
plea is an admission of all those elements;
(5) That the defendant knows the minimum and
maximum sentence that may be imposed upon him for
each offense to which a plea is entered, including
the possibility of the imposition of consecutive
sentences; and
(6) Whether the tendered plea is a result of
a prior plea discussion and plea agreement and if
so, what agreement has been reached.
If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or
any other party has agreed to request or recommend the
acceptance of a plea to a lesser included offense, or
the dismissal of other charges, the same shall be
approved by the court. If recommendations as to
sentence are allowed by the court, the court shall
advise the defendant personally that any
recommendation as to sentence is not binding on the
court.
(f) The judge shall not participate in plea
discussions prior to any agreement being made by the
prosecuting attorney, but once a tentative plea
agreement has been reached which contemplates entry of
a plea in the expectation that other charges will be
dropped or dismissed, the judge, upon request of the
parties, may permit the disclosure to him of such
tentative agreement and the reasons therefor in
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advance of the time for tender of the plea. The judge
may then indicate to the prosecuting attorney and
defense counsel whether he will approve the proposed
disposition. Thereafter, if the judge decides that
final disposition should not be handled in conformity
with the plea agreement, he shall so advise the
defendant and then call upon the defendant to either
affirm or withdraw his plea.
PRELIMINARY NOTE
This appeal is being filed in conjunction with an original
action for Habeas Corpus before this Court.

The Habeas Corpus

action concerns defendant's claim that he was denied effective
assistance of counsel during sentencing.

Because the events of

this appeal and the Habeas Corpus action concern the same
sentencing proceeding, some overlap of facts may occur.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On October 6, 1988 defendant Tracy Eugene Smith was charged
by the Beaver County Attorney with first degree capital murder in
the death of James Bray.

(R.

1-2). Because Defendant was

indigent and because a conflict existed with the legal defender's
office, attorney James L. Shumate was appointed by the court to
represent defendant Smith.

(R. 4).

A preliminary hearing was held in the Circuit Court of
Beaver County on October 17, 1988.

Circuit Court Judge Robert

Braithwaite bound Defendant over to the District Court for trial
as to the criminal offense of capital murder in the first degree.
On November 14, 1988 Defendant appeared before the Honorable
Philipe Eves for approval of a plea bargain and sentencing.

It

is during the proceedings that all claimed errors occurred.

Some

of these events are contained in the record.
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Other circumstances

and events are not contained in the record since there has been
no evidentiary hearing probing the entry of the guilty plea.
Since both the reported events and claimed unreported events may
be relevant to the outcome of this case, Defendant will
distinguish these two classifications by citing to the page in
the record where the event is reported or by noting that the
circumstances of an unreported event is being proffered by the
defendant and supporting testimony will be given at any
appropriate evidentiary hearing.
It is undisputed that the victim in this case was a white
truck driver from Kentucky.

Defendant at the time of the death

was 21 years old, was black, and was driving his automobile from
California through Utah.

The co-defendant Timothy Miller was a

white hitchhiker who had been picked up by the defendant.
On October 3, 1988 the victim James Bray entered a restroom
at a rest stop in Beaver County.
Mr. Bray while in the restroom.

Defendant Smith shot and killed
The defendant and Miller were

subsequently stopped by local police.

No personal items were

taken from Bray nor was any of Bray's property found in
possession of Defendant.
Defendant would proffer that at the time of the sentencing
proceeding on November 14, 1988 his grandmother, sister, aunt,
and several nieces were present.

The family was extremely

concerned about Defendant's fate.

Defendant would proffer that

he informed his attorney Mr. Shumate that the homicide occurred
because the victim called Mr. Smith a "nigger", informed him that
he should get out of the restroom immediatey, and started pushing
-4-

him physically.
Defendant would proffer that Mr. Shumate informed Defendant
and his family that no one in Beaver County would believe that
story and that his co-defendant Miller was going to testify that
they intended on robbing the victim.

Shumate asserted that

Defendant would probably be convicted of felony murder and very
possibly receive the death penalty.

Furthermore, Defendant

would proffer that Mr. Shumate informed Defendant and his family
that if he plead guilty to the charges and was sentenced to life
imprisonment, that the state Matrix Guidelines would authorize
his release in five to seven years based upon his previous
history and his youth.
Defendant would further proffer that Mr. Shumate never
informed him nor his family that the judge could also make
recommendations as to the number of years that the Board of
Pardons should retain custody of the defendant and that such
recommendations were often strictly followed.

As such,

therefore, Defendant would proffer that he agreed to enter into a
plea bargain in which the dealth penalty would not be sought in
exchange for a plea of guilty and a sentence of life
imprisonment.
Accordingly, Defendant read and initialed the plea
agreement prepared by the prosecuting attorney and by Mr.
Shumate.

(R. 23-29).

A copy of this agreement is contained in

the Addendum.
Prior to going into court Defendant would proffer that his
attorney, the prosecuting attorney, and the attorney for the
-5-

family, Mr. Hams Chamberlain, met with the court in chambers.

At

the conclusion of the meeting Defendant would proffer that Mr.
Shumate assured the defendant that the court would accept the
plea and sentence him to life imprisonment thereby giving the
Board of Pardons authority to release him under the prison
guidelines.

No mention of any recommendation of a minimum

sentence was ever made.
The reporter's transcript of the hearing is contained
several times in the official record (R.
155-179).

43-66; 89; 115-139;

For purposes of this appeal a copy of the transcript

is contained in the Addendum herein.

References will be made to

the original page of the court reporter's transcript to avoid any
confusion with the numerous copies in the record.
The Court interviewed the defendant in accordance with then
Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
U.C.A.).

(§77-35-11,

The defendant answered all of the Court's inquiries

consistently with the entry of a voluntary plea.

At the

conclusion of the dialogue between the Court and the defendant
the Court made the following statement:
All right. Mr. Smith, having in mind all that
we've talked about today—the possible penalties—
and I should tell you that if you plead guilty under
these circumstances, I most likely—most definitely
will sentence you to serve the rest of your life in
the Utah State Prison—having that in mind, is it your
desire to enter into this plea agreement?
MR. SMITH: Yes, Sir.
THE COURT: All right. If that's your desire,
sign the agreement. (Tr. 10).
The county attorney then explained to the court the theory
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of the case upon which Defendant would be prosecuted.

Basically,

the state would attempt to prove in a trial that Mr. Smith and
Mr. Miller had stopped at a rest station in Beaver County with
the purpose of finding someone to rob.

The victim, James Bray,

entered a restroom and was subsequently shot by the defendant in
an attempt to rob him.

(Tr. 12-13).

Subsequently, two men were

stopped in the town of Salina and a .9 mm weapon was taken from
them.

The bullet from the gun matched that which was found in

the victim.
At the conclusion of this explanation the following dialogue
occurred:
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Smith, you've heard
the prosecutor's statement as to what the state's case
would show in his estimation. Let me just ask you a
couple of questions to determine whether or not
there's a factual basis for this plea. Did you, in
fact, shoot James Glen Bray in the rest stop?
MR. SMITH: Yes, Sir.
THE COURT: In so doing, were you trying to rob
him?
MR. SMITH: No, Sir.
THE COURT: What was the reason that you shot
him?
MR. SMITH: Do I have to—do I have to?
THE COURT: Tell me what the reason way.
MR. SMITH: It was more or less—really, to tell
you the truth—a racial argument.
THE COURT: A racial argument?
MR. SMITH: Uh huh.

(Tr. 15).

Subsequently, Mr. Shumate explained that the only evidence
regarding a purported robbery would come from the testmony of
-7-

Timothy Miller in that no property of the victim was found in the
defendant's possession and apparently no property had in fact
been taken from the victim.

(Tr. 16-17).

In essence, Mr.

Shumate stated that the defendant agreed to plea to this case
even though he disagreed as to the attempted robbery because of
the "hazard of taking the facts to trial and resting our case
solely on Mr. Smith's testimony."

(Tr. 16, 19).

After listening to Mr. Chamberlain, the attorney for the
survivors of the victim, the Court made the following statement:
I'd like the record to reflect that prior to
taking the bench here in the open courtroom, all
counsel and I discussed this proposed plea bargain—
including Mr. Chamberlain—so that everyone was aware
of what the proposal was about before I took the
bench.
Well, based upon the representations made, I'm
going to find that there is a factual basis upon which
the plea may be rested. And I'm going to also find
that this plea is governed by the provisions of the
Alford decision—Alford v. North Carolina. And
I'm going to accept it on both of those bases, and I'm
going to order the plea of guilty entered.
Recommendations regarding sentencing in the
matter? (Tr. 19-20).
MR. SHUMATE: Your Honor, Mr. Smith would ask the
Court to allow him to waive the statutory time and
proceed with sentencing at this time rather than to
order the preparation of a presentence report, in view
of the nature of the plea and the circumstances of the
facts before the court.
I don't think that the Court's sentencing
alternatives are substantial at all, and we're
prepared to go forth with that at this time.
THE COURT: All right.
objection?

Does the state have any

MR. KANELL: The state does not oppose that.
THE COURT: All right.

Mr. Smith, just so you're
-8-

clear on this, the law allows you two days before your
sentence and up to thirty days for sentencing. And
you have the right to take advantage of that delay if
you wish.
Your counsel has indicated that you want to give
up that right and be sentenced today; is that right?
MR. SMITH: Yes, Sir.
THE COURT: All right. You realize that and I've
already told you that if I sentence you today, it's
going to be to the State Prison for the rest of your
life. Do you understand that?
MR. SMITH: Yes, Sir.
THE COURT: And having that in mind, do you still
wish to waive your right to a delay?
MR. SMITH: Yes, Sir.
THE COURT: All right. The record will reflect
that waiver.. Does either counsel with to present
anything before I impose sentence? Mr. Shumante?
MR. SHUMATE: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Mr. Smith do you wish to make a
statement in your own behalf before I impose
sentence?
MR. SMITH: I'm sorry for what happened. I wish,
you know, if he could feel my apology, I know that it
can't bring him back, but I didn't mean to do it.
THE COURT: Anything else?
MR. SMITH: That's it.
THE COURT: Mr. Kanell, anything?
MR. KANELL: Your Honor, pursuant to the plea
agreement, the state does not have any evidence of
aggravating circumstances to present, and the state
does not request the Court to sentence the defendant
to the death sentence.
THE COURT: Does not request that?
MR. KANELL: Does not request that.
THE COURT: All right.
-9-

MR. KANELL: The state requests the Court to
sentence the defendant to life in prison.
THE COURT: Anything else?
MR. SHUMATE: I'll submit it.
THE COURT: All right. Tracy Eugene Smith, having
been convicted by your own plea of the offense of
murder in the first degree, a capital offense, in
violation of the laws of the State of Utah, I now
sentence you to the Utah State Prison for the rest of
your natural life.
I'm also going to make a recommendation to the
Board of Pardons, which I would like included in the
order, that Mr. Smith serve twenty years before he is
considered to be released from the Utah State Prison.
Anything else?
MR. SHUMATE: No, Your Honor.

(Tr. 20-22).

Subsequently, on November 23, 1988 a judgment, sentence and
commitment was signed by the lower court including the provision
that the defendant not be allowed "parole or even be considered
for parole until he has served at least twenty years."

(R.

30-31).
On December 22, 1988 the defendant prepared a "Notice of
Belated Appeal" while incarcerated at the Utah State Prison,
Draper, Utah.

(R. 33). Defendant filed a supporting affidavit

which was also notarized on December 22, 1988 which stated in
part "that appointed counsel assured Defendant that a timely
court, base upon but not limited to ineffective assistance of
counsel.

That counsel did not fully investigate the facts of the

case at bar that could have proven the defendant's innocence."
(R. 34).
The remainder of the affidavit explained that he was unable
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This matter was called on LUL rearing at the
request of the defendant* Mr. Shumate informed and
the defendant concurred that the motion be
voluntarily withdrawn. Mr. Shumate stated that the
defendant will pursue his requested relief in the
federal court system. The appeal was ordered
withdrawn. (R
86)
On Hine 29, 1^8 9 a remittitur was issued by this « mi > w^i« »»
stated

t ii '"\

this appeal

i

November ±?t

i
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it is ordered *hat
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990 Defendant sen
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transcripts
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Withdraw Guil ^ -
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December 4, 1991.

(R.

100-12)-

The basis of Defendant's motion

was his assertion that the lower court should not have accepted a
guilty plea for capital first degree murder when Defendant
specifically denied that he was attempting to rob the victim.

He

essentially discounted the testimony of the co-defendant as not
being believable.
The Beaver County Attorney Leo Kanell responded to this
motion by arguing that the testimony of the co-defendant Miller
would have been sufficient for a jury to believe that an
attempted robbery occurred during the killing and therefore
Defendant could have been convicted of first degree capital
murder and sentenced to death.

Moreover, since the defendant

made his plea to eliminate the risk of the death penalty the
court was justified under Alford v. North Carolina to accept the
plea even though he did not admit to the robbery motive.

(Tr.

140-44).
On February 24, 1992 a memorandum opinion was entered by
Judge Philipe Eves.

(R. 150-53).

The court concluded that

Defendant was incorrect in asserting that there was not
sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude that he was guilty of
capital first degree murder.

The Court stated:

The state's evidence, though less than
overwhelming, may well have been sufficient to convice
a trier of fact that the defendant attempted to commit
a robbery and shot the victim in the process.
Certainly the evidence was disputed at best. (R.
152) .
On March 23, 1992 this Court acknowledged the Notice of
Appeal having been filed and assigned this case No. 920141.
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(R.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
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Defendant does
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*

whether it: was spontaneously decided by
s e r i t eiij; 1 iiiij ,

1m
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f o t met

defendant should have been informed before entering a plea

the
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was the latter Defendant's counsel should have objected on the
basis that this recommendation materially changed any agreement
that Defendant had made concerning his plea.
The lower court also committed prejudicial error separate
and apart from that of Defendant's counsel.

Under the present

record there was no basis for the lower court to make a twenty
year recommendation except for the evidence which was offered by
the state in support of a conviction.

The court on its own

motion should have either requested additional information
concerning the circumstances of the crime and the life of the
defendant or should have made no recommendation whatsoever to the
Board of Pardons.
ARGUMENT
INTRODUCTION
This is an unusual case.

Defendant's present counsel was

appointed for the purpose of representing Defendant in an appeal
from the order of the lower court denying Defendant's motion to
withdraw his guilty plea.

After review of the record appellate

counsel concluded that the lower court was absolutely correct in
its ruling.

Since Mr. Miller was purportedly ready to testify as

to the intention of robbing the victim there is no question but
that a jury could have believed Miller's testimony and coud have
found Defendant guilty of capital murder.

The argument that

Defendant made to the lower court was simply without merit.
Initially, counsel considered filing an Anders brief
allowing Defendant to argue his position in spite of counsel's
belief to the contrary.

Appellate counsel has spoken in length
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DEFENDANT SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO WITHDRAW
HIS GUILTY PLEA OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE,
THE COURT'S RECOMMENDATION OF A MINIMUM
TWENTY-YEAR SENTENCE SHOULD BE DELETED.
Be« .riiist"' HI fuli-vi of rjyiii'Y absolutely waives constitutional
protections which insulate the accuse*admission that the accused has transgressed the laws, it accords

- 1

t;_

with due process only if voluntarily and intelligently made.
Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S.

487 (1962).

An

intelligent plea is the culmination of a rational decision making
process, in which the accused assesses the numerous factors which
bear upon his choice of whether to formally admit his guilty or
to put the state to its proof.

The pleas must represent the

informed, self-determined choices of the defendant among
practicable alternatives.

Van Moltke v. Gilles, 332 U.S.

708 (1948).
In determining whether a guilty plea should be set aside
certain principles of law must be applied.

If there is any doubt

that a plea is not voluntary, the doubt should be resolved in
defendant's favor.

On application to change a plea, all doubt

should be resolved in favor of a trial on the merits.

State

v. Huttinqer, 595 P.2d 363 (Mont. 1979).
The question as to whether a plea is voluntarily entered
will turn on the facts and circumstances of each particular case.
Caputo v. Henderson, 541 F.2d 979 (2d Cir.

1976).

When

claims are made of incorrect or insufficient information as to
sentencing, the proper test to be applied is whether defendant
would have pleaded differently had he been correctly informed.
The burden is upon the state to prove no error and in some
situations the error may be so egregous that involuntariness may
be conclusively presumed.

Taylor v. Nevada State Prison

Warden, 607 P.2d 587 (Nev. 1980).
This Court in State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (1987)
established strict standards that must be utilized whenever a

plea of 'pjiTty is being taken.

This Court stated:

The details of any plea bargain should ~e .—_'
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Procedure allows an agreement to be disclosed to a court in
advance of the time for tender of the plea.

The judge will then

indicate to the prosecuting attorney and defense counsel whether
he will approve the proposed disposition.

This Court in State v.

Kay, 717 P.2d 1294 (Utah 1986) found that Section 76-3-207,
U.C.A. as well as Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure, permit a trial judge to accept a guilty plea
conditioned upon the judge's promise not to impose the death
penalty.

The trial court may not refuse to comply with the terms

of an accepted plea agreement unless circumstances justify the
declaration of a misplea; otherwise, the double jeopardy clause
precludes subsequent trial of that defendant.

Id.

In the instant case, the plea agreement clearly stated that
Defendant's "plea of guilty to the offense of first degree
murder, a capital offense, is conditional upon the court's
imposition of a sentence of life imprisonment." (R.

26). The

plea agreement as conditionally approved by the court prior to
the hearing did not include any reference to the court's
recommendation as to the length of a minimum sentence.

Likewise,

at no time prior to Defendant's plea did the Court inform
Defendant that he would recommend a twenty-year sentence or even
that he might make a sentence recommendation.

The statement made

by the lower court as to the twenty-year recommendation
completely changed the terms of the agreement that Defendant
believed he had obtained.
As this Court is well aware, a sentence of "life
imprisonment" up until last year was for an indefinite period of

time
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due process of law and effective assistance of counsel.

As such,

any plea that was made by the defendant must be vacated since he
was unaware of the conditional terms that the lower court had
established.
The second alternative is that the lower court did not
inform Defendant's attorney as to this twenty-year recommendation
and therefore there was nothing to communicate to the defendant
and his family.

During the entire sentencing proceeding the

lower court on several occasions mentioned that he would sentence
Defendant to "life imprisonment" but never mentioned that he
would recommend a twenty-year commitment.

If this be the case,

the lower court breached the conditional agreement that it had
entered with defense counsel and Defendant by adding this
additional provision to the terms of the agreement.

Again,

Defendant would be entitled to vacate the guilty plea or to
eliminate this extraneous condition to the guilty plea in order
for the state to claim the benefit of the bargain concerning the
guilty plea.
In either case, however, it is clear that the twenty-year
recommendation of the lower court was an unanticipated factor in
Defendant's agreement to give up all of his constitutional rights
of trial.

It is submitted that since the record does not

affirmatively show this condition either in the plea agreement or
in the dialogue with the defendant prior to his entry of the
guilty plea that, as a matter of law, the twenty-year
recommendation must be removed or the guilty plea must be
vacated.

State v. Maquire, 830 P.2d 216 (Utah 1992).

If this Court, however, believes that an evidentiary record
is needed in this matter to establish the circumstances of the
plea, it is submitted that the hearing in the habeas corpus
action will provide this evidentiary basis.

The facts of

counsel's actions will necessarily overlap into the elements of
the plea bargain.
POINT II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ENTERING A TWENTY
YEAR RECOMMENDATION OF INCARCERATION WHEN
THERE WAS NO FACTUAL RECORD BEFORE THE
COURT JUSTIFYING SUCH DECISION.
Aside from the fundamental breach of the plea bargain
itself, the recommendation of the twenty-year minimum sentence
was a clear abuse of disrection and without factual basis. At
the time of sentencing the Court had absolutely nothing before it
to justify the imposition of a twenty-year recommendation to the
Board of Pardons.

The Court had no presentence investigation,

had no information obtained from other sources of a presentence
nature, did not know anything of Defendant's background, had not
heard Defendant's version of the death, and was unaware of any of
Defendant's past circumstances and history.

The Court knew

essentially nothing concerning the circumstances of the death,
had seen no pictures of the body, did not know how the wound was
inflicted, and knew nothing that would justify this severe
enhancement to the normal life sentence imposition.
While it was proper for the lower court to have entered a
sentence of life imprisonment based on the plea agreement, the
enhancement of the twenty-year recommendation was clear and

-21-

undisputed error.

As noted earlier, courts must sentence

criminal defendants based upon rational and reliable information
and not upon whim or caprice.

A review of the existing record

shows that this recommendation was without any factual or legal
basis.
CONCLUSION
The waiver of all constitutional rights to trial is a
serious matter.

This Court has repeatedly held the state to a

high standard of proof to show that a defendant voluntarily and
knowingly gave up his rights in exchange for a course of action
by the prosecutor.

In the exceptional cases involving

conditional pleas an even higher standard applies since the court
itself is involved in the plea negotiations.
Here, the Court approved the life sentence in lieu of the
death penalty before Defendant even entered his plea.

No

reference on the record was ever given to Defendant as to the
twenty-year recommendation.

Certainly, if a prosecutor had

attempted to make this kind of an unanticipated recommendation
after a plea bargain had been made, a defendant could easily
claim a material breach.

In this case, the lower court was also

bound not to materially change the basis of the agreement.
Independent of this breach of the plea bargain, the lower
court abused its discretion in making the twenty-year
recommendation when it had no evidentiary basis at all to take
such a radical action.

The sentence of life imprisonment is

severe enough in a normal homicide—the Board of Pardons has
tremendous discretion in the number of years a defendant will
-22-

serve even though the matrix guidelines define a time frame of
anticipated imprisonmet.

The recommendation of a trial court is

always given considerable weight since it is assumed that the
court has relevant and accurate information upon which to base
its recommendation.

Here, such assumption is incorrect but the

Board of Pardons nevertheless followed the twenty-year
recommendation.
These errors combined with ineffective counsel during the
entire sentencing proceeding (as will be developed in the habeas
corpus action) require vacation of the guilty plea or
elimination of the twenty-year recommendation.
Respectfully submitted this 13th day of November, 1992.

Craig s/lcook
Attorney^for Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY
I hereby certify that I personally delivered four true and
correct copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to David B.
Thompson, Assistant Attorney General, 236 State Capitol Building,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 this 13th day of November, 1992.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BEAVER, STATE OF UTAH

STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT
REGARDING PLEA BARGAIN,
CERTIFICATES OF COUNSEL,
AND ORDER

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff
vs.

Criminal No. 631

TRACY EUGENE SMITH,
Defendant,

STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT REGARDING PLEA AGREEMENT
,43

I* TRACY EUGENE SMITH, the above-named Defendant, under

oath, hereby acknowledge that I have entered a plea of guilty to
the charge of MURDER IN THE FIRST DEGREE, a capital offense, as
contained

in

the

Information

on

file

against

me

in

the

above-entitled Court, a copy of which I have received, and I
understand the charge to which this plea of guilty is entered is
a capital felony and that I am entering such plea voluntarily and
of my own free will after conferring with my attorney, JAMES L.
SHUMATE,

and

with

following facts:

the

knowledge

and

understanding

of

the

1.

I know that I have constitutional rights under the

Constitutions of Utah .and the United States to plead not guilty
and to have a jury trial upon the charges to which I have entered
a plea of guilty or to a trial by the Court should I elect to
waive

a

trial by

jury.

I know that

I have a right to be

represented by counsel and that I am in fact represented by JAMES
L. SHUMATE as my attorney.
2.

I know that if I wish to have a trial upon the

charges, I have a right to be confronted by the witnesses against
me by having them testify, in open court, in my presence and
before the Court and jury and that I have the right to have those
witnesses cross-examined by my attorney.
the right to have witnesses

subpoenaed

I also know that I have
by the State, at its

expense, to testify in Court upon my behalf and that I could, if
I elected to do so,.testify in Court upon my own behalf and that,
if I choose not to do so, the jury can and will be told that this
fact may not be held against me if I choose to have the jury so
instructed.
^jvp

3.

I know that if I were to have a trial, the State

must prove each and every element of the crime charged to the
satisfaction of the Court or jury beyond a reasonable doubt; that
I would have no obligation to offer any evidence myself and that
any verdict rendered by a jury, whether it be that of guilty or
not guilty, must be by unanimous agreement of all jurors.

-2-
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4.

I know that under the Constitutions of Utah and of

the United States I have a right against self-incrimination or a
right not to give evidence against myself and that this means
that I cannot be compelled to testify in Court upon trial unless
I choose to do so,
,4 0

5.

I know that under the Constitution of Utah, if I

were tried and convicted by a jury or by the Court, I would have
a right to appeal my conviction and sentence to either the Court
of Appeals or the Supreme Court of Utah for review of the trial
proceedings and that if I could not afford to pay the costs for
such appeal, those costs would be paid by the State without cost
to me and that I would have the right to have the assistance of
counsel on such appeal*
6.

I know and understand that by entering a plea of

guilty I am waiving my constitutional rights as set out in the
five

preceding

paragraphs

and

that

I

am,

in

fact,

fully

incriminating myself by admitting that I am guilty of the crimes
to which my plea of guilty is entered*
H^

7.

I know that under the laws of Utah the maximum

sentence that can and may be imposed upon my plea of guilty to
the charges identified on page one of this affidavit is:
A.

Death or life imprisonment*

and that the imprisonment may be for consecutive periods if my
plea is to more than one charge.

I also know that if I am on

probation, parole or awaiting sentencing upon another offense of
-3-

which I have been convicted or to which I have pleaded guilty, my
plea in the present action may result in consecutive sentences
being imposed on me.
8.

I know that the fact that I have entered a plea of

guilty does not mean that the Court will not impose either a fine
or sentence of imprisonment upon me and no promises have been
made to me by anyone as to what the sentence will be if I plead
guilty or that it will be made lighter because of my guilty plea.
9.

No one has forced or threatened or coerced me to

obtain my plea of guilty and I am doing so of my own free will
and

after

discussing

it with my attorney.

I know that any

opinions he may have expressed to me as to what he believes the
Court may do are not binding upon the Court.
ri3

10.

No promises of any kind have been made to induce

me to plead guilty except that I have been told that if I do
plead guilty, the State has agreed to not request the death
penalty

and

to not present

hearing before the court.
of

guilty

any

aggravating

evidence at the

I have also been informed that my plea

to the offense of FIRST DEGREE MURDER, a capital

offense, is conditional upon the court's imposition of a sentence
of life imprisonment.

I understand that should the court impose

the death penalty, I may withdraw my plea of guilty and require
the State of Utah to go forward with a trial in the matter. I am
also

aware

that

any

charge

or

sentencing

concessions

or

recommendations for probation or suspended sentences, including a
-4-

reduction of the charges for sentencing made or sought by either
defense counsel or the prosecutor are not binding on the Court
and may or may not be approved or followed by the Court.
11,

I am not now under the influence of either drugs

or alcohol.
^ 3

12.

I have read this Statement or I have had it read

to me by my attorney and I have placed my initials beside each
paragraph to indicated that I know and understand its contents.
I am

Jj/

the

l^L-

years of age, have attended school through
and I can read and understand the

English Language.

I have discussed its contents with my attorney

and I ask the Court to accept my plea of guilty to the charges
set forth above in this statement because I did f in fact,
(1)

on the 3rd day of October, 1988, intentionally and

knowlingly cause the death of JAMES GLEN BRAY, while
engaged in the commission of an attempted, aggravated
robbery;
(2) That I did so within Beaver County, State of
Utah.
:an.
DATED

this

/ V ^ d a y of Afotsci*

btiA

1988.

TRACY EUGENE SMITH
Defendant

-5-

CERTIFICATE OF DEFENSE ATTORNEY
I certify that I am the attorney

for TRACY EUGENE

SMITH# the Defendant above-named/ and I know the Defendant has
read the Affidavit or that I have read it to the Defendant? I
have

discussed

it

with

the

Defendant

and

believe

that the

Defendant fully understands the meaning of its contents and is
mentally and physically competent.

To the best of my knowledge

and belief/ after an appropriate investigation/ the elements of
the crime(s) and the factual synopsis of the Defendant's criminal
conduct are correctly stated/ and these/ along with the other
representations and declarations made by the Defendant in the
foregoing Statement are# in all respects/ accurate and true.
DATED this /C/

day of /j/a^^A*?*-

, 1988.

HUMATE*
ttorney for Defendant
CERTIFICATE OF>PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah
in

its case

reviewed

against

TRACY

the

Statement

declarations/

including

of

EUGENE
the

SMITH/ Defendant.

Defendant

the elements

of

and

find

I have
that

the offense

of

the
the

charge(s) and the factual synopsis of the Defendant's criminal
conduct which constitutes the offense(s) are true and correct.
No improper inducements/ threats/ or coercions to encourage a
plea have been offered to the Defendant.
-6-

The plea negotiations

are fully contained in this Statement and in the attached plea
agreement or as supplemented on the record before the Court,
There is reasonable cause to believe the evidence would support
the conviction of the Defendant for the offense (s) for which the
plea(s) are entered and acceptance of the plea(s) would serve the
public interest.
DATED this /jti

day of

Wfrs**^

1988.

LEO G. KANELL
Beaver County Attorney
ORDER
Based

upon

the

facts

set

forth

in

the

foregoing

Statement of Defendant regarding Plea Bargain and the foregoing
Certificates of Counsel, the Court finds the Defendant's plea of
guilty is freely and voluntarily made, and it is so ordered that
the Defendant's pleas of "guilty" to the charge(s) set forth in
the foregoing Statement be accepted and entered.
The foregoing Statement of Defendant was signed before
me this

/ T -day of

/^t^t^H/^^f 1988.

Judge
88cr49
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THE COURT:

We're back in session.

It's 20

minutes to 2:00.
I111 first call Criminal No. 631, State of
Utah versus Tracy Eugene Smith.
MR. SHUMATE:

They are just removing the

handcuffs on Mr. Smith, Your Honor, so that he can have
the hands in front of him so he can sign this item.
If I could approach the bench, Your Honor,
I can give Your Honor a copy of this.

We'll keep the

original while we execute it.
THE COURT:

All right.

Thank you.

The record should reflect that Mr. Smith
is now present with his counsel Mr. Shumate.
This matter comes on at your request.

Did

you want to tell the Court what we're doing?
MR. SHUMATE:

Yes, Your Honor.

This matter is

before the Court for the arraignment before Your Honor
and the entry of a plea pursuant to a plea bargain
agreement entered into between the defendant, myself,
and the State of Utah, represented by Mr. Kane11.
The defendant is presently charged with
first-degree murder, a capital offense.

The plea

agreement contemplates a plea of guilty to be entered
to that offense on a conditional basis.

That is, that

if the Court were to impose the sentence of death, that
the conditional plea could be withdrawn.

If the Court

were to impose the sentence of life imprisonment, then
the plea would stand.
Mr. Smith and I have discussed the matter
in substantial detail.

The case has been through a

preliminary hearing and, of course, was bound over for
arraignment today.

The Statement of Defendant

Regarding Plea Bargain and certificates of counsel have
been prepared.
it.

Mr. Smith has read it; has initialed

He has not yet signed it but intends to sign it

here in open court before Your Honor.
THE COURT:

All right.

Is your full, true, and correct name Tracy
Eugene Smith?
MR. SMITH:

Yes, sir.

THE COURT:

All right.

And how old are you,

Mr. Smith?
MR. SMITH:

21.

THE COURT:

And do you read and write English?

MR. SMITH:

Yes, sir.

THE COURT:

Have you read the Information which

has been filed in this case against ycu?

4
MR. SMITH:

Yes, sir.

THE COURT:

All right.

that Information with you.

I'm going to go through

It's relatively short.

I'm

going to read it to you now.
State of Utah versus Tracy Eugene Smith.
Date of birth, March 16, 1967.
MR. SMITH:

17th.

THE COURT:

March 17, 1967.

I'll make that

amendment.
Information in Circuit Court No. 88-CR-ll,
District Court No. 631.
The undersigned under oath states on
information and belief that the above-named defendant,
Tracy Eugene Smith, committed the following criminal
offense, to wit: Murder in the first-degree, a capital
offense, in violation of Section 76-5-201 and 76-5-202
(1) (d), Utah Code Annotated as amended 1953, in that
on or about the 3rd day of October, 1983, within Beaver
County, State of Utah, the said defendant intentionally
or knowingly caused the death of James Glen Bray under
the following circumstances.
"The homicide was committed while the
actor was engaged in the commission of or an attempt to
commit an aggravated robbery or robbery."

In addition,

a firearm was used in the commission or in furtherance

of the felony.
This Information was based on evidence
obtained from Raymond Goodwin and Sheriff Kenneth
Yardley.

Signed by Leo G. Kanell, Beaver County

Attorney.

Authorize by presentment and filing by

Mr. Kanell and subscribed and sworn to by me on the 6th
day of October, 1988,
Do you understand the Information,
Mr. Smith?
MR. SMITH:

Yes, sir.

THE COURT:

All right.

You have the right in

this matter to be represented by an attorney.

And you

are represented by Mr. Shumate standing there beside
you; is that correct?
MR. SMITH:

Yes, sir.

THE COURT:

And have you had an opportunity to

consult with him to your satisfaction?
MR. SMITH:

Yes, sir.

THE COURT:

Okay.

You also have the right to

require the State to prove each and every element of
this offense beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial
either before the Court or before a jury.
The elements of the offense which the
State would have to prove and which you would be
admitting if you plead guilty in this matter ara

6
these;

That on or about the 3rd day of October, 1988,

within this county and state, you intentionally or
knowingly caused the death of James Glen Bray while
engaged in the commission of or attempt to commit
aggravated robbery or robbery.
Do you understand those elements?
MR, SMITH:

Yes, sir.

THE COURT:

Now, as I understand the law —

correct me if I'm wrong —

and

the firearms enhancement

does not apply in a capital case.
Is that correct?

There is no firearms

enhancement?
MR. KANELL:

I'm not aware of any enhancement

under that section.
THE COURT:
MR. SHUMATE:
THE COURT:

Is that correct?
The Court is correct, Your Honor.
So I won't explain the firearms

enhancement.
Do you understand all those elements that
I just went over?
MR. SMITH:

Yes, sir.

THE COURT:

If you admit those elements by

pleading guilty to this offense, then the State doesn't
have to prove them at all.
your own statement.

You'll stand convicted by

Do you understand that?
MR. SMITH:

Yes, sir.

THE COURT:

All right.

If you decided to go

forward with the trial, you would have the right at the
trial to confront and cross-examine the witnesses
against you, meaning you would have the right to hear
them testify and ask them questions through your legal
counsel.

You would have the right not to testify or

give evidence against yourself, meaning nobody could
call

you as a witness;

statement.

nobody

could make you make a

And, of course, if you plead guilty, you'll

make a statement which is the ultimate evidence against
you.

You would have also the right to present any

evidence you wish to in that trial or to testify if you
chose to testify.
Do you understand all those rights?
MR. SMITH:

Yes, sir.

THE COURT:

Okay.

waive all those rights.

If you plead guilty, you
The trial —

the trial will

not take place, and you won't have those opportunities
and those rights I just explained.
Do you understand that?
MR. SMITH:

Uh-huh.

THE COURT:

You have to answer out loud.

Mo
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THE COURT:

Thank you.

If this offense is

admitted by you, it could be punishable by death, or it
could be punishable by life imprisonment.
Normally a trier —
those —

the sentence.

a jury would determine

You would have a right to have

a jury determine which of those sentences would be
imposed if you were convicted of the offense.
Again, if you plead guilty under the
conditions of this agreement, this would entail a
conditional plea, meaning that you would plead guilty
upon basically a commitment by the Court that a life
sentence would be the punishment that would be imposed
as opposed to death.

And if the Court, in fact,

pronounced the death sentence, you would have the right
to withdraw your plea.
Do you understand that?
MR. SMITH:

Yes, sir.

THE COURT:

All right.

Do you have any

questions about the nature of the charges against you
or the possible penalties?
MR. SMITH:

No, sir.

THE COURT:

Okay.

Do you have any questions

about the fact that the State has the burden of proving
these charges?
MR. SMITH:

No, sir.

THE COURT:

Olcay.

Do you have any questions at

all about anything we've discussed to this point?
MR. SMITH:" No, sir.
THE COURT:

All right.

Has anyone brought any

force or fear or threat to bear against you to cause
you to enter into this agreement?
MR. SMITH:

No, sir.

THE COURT:

All right.

Are you acting freely

and voluntarily?
MR. SMITH:

Yes, sir.

THE COURT:

Are you under the influence of

alcohol or —
MR. SMITH:

No, sir.

THE COURT:

-- drugs?

MR. SMITH:

No, sir.

THE COURT:

Mental or physical illness?

MR. SMITH:

No, sir.

THE COURT:

So you feel like there's nothing

impairing

your ability

to make a decision

MR. SMITH:

No, sir.

THE COURT:

Okay.

today?

Have you reviewed this

Statement of Defendant Regarding Plea Bargain?
MR. SMITH:

Yes, sir.

THE COURT:

Are these your initials that appear

by each paragraph?

MR, SMITH:

Yes.

THE COURT:

Have you signed the document?

MR. SHUMATE:

He has not, Your Honor.

We intend

to sign the document a- this point.
THE COURT:

All right.

Mr. Smith, having in

mind all that we've talked about today —
penalties —

the possible

and I should tell you that if you plead

guilty under these circumstances, I most likely — mosT:
definitely will sentence you to serve the rest of your
life in the Utah State Prison —

having that in mind,

is it your desire to enter into this plea agreement?
MR. SMITH:

Yes, sir.

THE COURT:

All right.

If that!s your desire,

sign the agreement.
(Whereupon the agreement was signed.)
THE COURT:

The record should reflect that the

defendant has, in fact, affixed his signature in the
presence of the Court.
I note in reading Paragraph 10 of the
agreement, that it was also part of the plea agreement,
that the State agreed not to request, the death penalty
and net to present any aggravating evidence at a
hearing before the Court.
Is that correct?
MR. KANELL:

That's correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

Is that part of your agreement,

Mr. Shumate?
MR. SHUMATE:

It is, Your Honor,

THE COURT:

And you understand that, Mr. Smith?

MR. SMITH:

Yes, sir.

THE COURT:

All right.

Now, have we stated the

entire agreement as you understand it, Mr. Smith?
MR. SMITH:

Yes, sir.

THE COURT:

I find that the defendant is acting

freely and voluntarily.

He appears to be alert and

responsive to the questioning of the Court.

He appears

to know what he's doing and what this plea agreement is
about.
Do you agree, Mr. Shumate?
MR. SHUMATE:

Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

Do you agree, Mr. Smith?

MR. SMITH:

Yes, sir.

MR. SHUMATE:

Your Honor, perhaps we could make

a brief record an that.
Tracy, your family has also been here this
morning; is that correct?
MR. SMITH:
MR. SHUMATE:

Yes, sir.
And you've had an opportunity to

visit with your mother, your grandmother, your aunt,
and your sister; is that correct?

MR. SMITH:

Yes, sir.

MR. SHUMATE:
at this time?

And they are here in the courtroom

Is that also correct?

MR. SMITH:

Yes.

MR. SHUMATE:

And it«s after discussing the

matter with them and with me and with all of us
together, that you have determined to enter into this
decision; is that correct?
MR. SMITH:

Yes, sir.

MR. SHUMATE:
THE COURT:

Thank you.
Do you have any questions at all,

Mr. Smith, about anything that is contained in this
Statement of Defendant Regarding Plea Bargain?
MR. SMITH:

No, sir.

THE COURT:

Do you feel you understand your

rights in this matter?
MR. SMITH:

Yes, sir.

THE COURT:

Have I presented an adequate record,

Mr. Shumate?

Anything you can think of I need to do?

MR. SHUMATE:
THE COURT:
MR. KANELL:

THE COURT:

Yes.

I think the Court has.

Mr. Kanell?
Yes, Your Honor.

All right.

I think that's

Are you ready now to

enter your plea, then, to the charge cf murder in the

first-degree, Mr. Smith?
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MR. SMITH:

Yes, sir.

THE COURT:

What is your plea?

MR. SMITH:

Guilty.

THE COURT:

What is the factual basis?

MR, KANELL:

Your Honor, the State's case is

7

that the defendant, Mr. Smith, and another companion

8

that he had picked up hitchhiking were traveling along

9

1-15 in a stolen vehicle.

10

As they came into Beaver County, they had

11

previously used up their last money for gas for the

12

vehicle, and they stopped at a rest station north of

13

town there locking for someone to rob; that a truck

14

driver by the name of James —

15

THE COURT:

16

MR. KANELL:

excuse me.

James (Slen Bray.
James Glen 3ray had stopped at the

17

rest stop there to —

he had made a phone call.

18

went into the rest room.

19

observed coming into the rest room by a witness who was

20

in the rest room.

21

rest room, he observed a black male enter the rest

22

room.

22

his girlfriend, he was —

24

loud banging sound.

25

the black man then came cut of the rest room, walking

That the truck driver was

He left —

And as he was —

He

as he was leaving the

this witness was outside with
in a short time, he heard a

He was not sure what it was, but

14
briskly, got into a car in the passenger's seat of the
car, and that car drove away.

This occurred shortly

after 8:00 o'clock at night.
It was dark.

The car, as it left the rest

area, kept its lights off until it got out onto the
freeway, and then the lights were turned off, and the
car sped off.
THE COURT:
MR. KANELL:

Turned on, you mean?
Turned on.

That's correct, Your

Honor.
The witness who was there —
girlfriend —

and his

drove on and contacted the sheriff's

department and gave a description of the vehicle and of
the black man and the white man that they had
observed.
The defendant and a co-defendant,
Mr. Miller, were observed in the town of Salina and
were stopped by officers there and questioned.

The

defendant produced a 9mm weapon, which he held on his
person.

That weapon was taken into evidence and was

analysed by the state crime lab by ballistics experts.
It was found that the bullet that killed
Mr. Bray and the shell that was left in the rest room
matched the bullet or shell that would have been shot
by that weaoon.

And that's basically the State!s case,
Your Honor.
THE COURT:

All right.

Mr. Smith, you've heard

the prosecutor's statement as to what the State's case
would show in his estimation.

Let me just ask you a

couple questions to determine whether or not there's a
factual basis for this plea.
Did you, in fact, shoot James Glen Bray in
the rest stop?
MR. SMITH:

Yes, sir.

THE COURT:

And in so doing, were you trying to

rob him?
MR. SMITH:

No, sir.

THE COURT:

What was the reason that you shot

MR. SMITH:

Do I have to —

THE COURT:

Tell me what the reason was.

MR. SMITH:

It was more or less —

him?

tell you the truth —

do I have to?

really, to

a racial argument.

THE COURT:

A racial argument?

MR. SMITH:

Uh-huh.

THE COURT:

Mr. Shumate, do you agree t h a t the

S t a t e ' s e v i d e n c e of the robbery would be as Mr. Kaneli
has s t a t e d

it?

MR. SHUMATE:

Ycur Honor, t h e S t a t e ' s

evidence

16
regarding robbery will most likely come from the
co-defendant, Timothy Michael Miller, in Criminal
No. 620.
Mr. Miller was the individual driving the
vehicle at the time.

He has made statements

implicating at least an intention to seek money at the
rest areas by means of the gun.
Mr. Smith and I have discussed the
potential hazards of taking those facts to trial, and
he and I have both agreed that the resolution of the
case as contemplated in the plea agreement is
appropriate; that the hazard of taking the facts to
trial and resting our case solely on Mr. Smith!s
testimony is such that the plea agreement is more
advisable.
THE COURT:
*V •
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THE COURT:

Is that right, Mr. Smith?
A C S |

4 A 4 l

Do you understand what your attorney

is saying?
MR. SMITH:

Pretty much.

THE COURT:

You understand that he's saying that

even though you disagree with the evidence about
robbery, that he faels and has so advised you that if
your co-defendant testifies that you went there to rob
somebody, that a jury might be swayed by that, and you

might receive even a more severe penalty —
penalty?

a death

Do you understand that?

MR. SMITH:

Yes, sir.

THE COURT:

And having that in mind, is it your

desire to enter into a plea agreement, knowing that
61

you're going to be sentenced to prison for the rest of

7

your life?

S

MR. SMITH:

Yes, sir.

9

THE COURT:

Is that a satisfactory record,

10

Mr. Kanell?

11

MR. KANELL:

121

THE COURT:
MR. SHUMATE:

Yes, Your Honor.
Mr. Shumate?
Your Honor, perhaps the record

141

should also reflect that the impetus for the plea

15

agreement is a weakness in the State!s evidence in

161

terms that there was no evidence and is no evidence
that any property or other thing of value was taken

ISI

from the victim there at the rest area.

19

THE COURT:
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MR. KANELL:

n 1

Is that correct, Mr. Kanell?
That is correct, Your Honor.

That

is a weakness in the State's case.
THE COURT:

So, in fact, there was no actual

robbery, and your evidence would be basically
241

circumstantial as to what the intent of the defendant
was ?

13
MR. KANELL:

That's correct, Your Honor.

In

fact, the Circuit Court bound over cnly on the issue of
attempted robbery as an aggravated factor.

And in the

plea bargain, I believe it states under the factual
basis, that it was an attempted robbery.
THE COURT:

All right.

Did you understand all

that, Mr. Smith?
MR. SMITH:

Yes, sir.

THE COURT:

Do you have any questions about

MR. SMITH:

No, sir.

THE COURT:

All right.

that?

Mr. Chamberlain, do you

want to make a record with regard to your concerns in
this matter?
MR. CHAMBERLAIN:

Yes, Your Honor.

Ifd like the

record to show that I represent the family of the
victim.

I've been contacted by them.

Specifically by

Rcwena Hoskins, who is the sister of James Glen Bray,
the victim in this matter..
I've spent a considerable amount of
time —

a considerable amount of time with the

sheriff's office in reviewing records.
it with Mr. Kanell and Mr. Shumate.

I've discussed

Because of their

concern that justice be served, I have —

shortly

before the lunch hour, I learned of the proposed plea
PAUT. n

Mrvinr r T>T
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agreement that has been stated on the record, whereby
Mr. Smith would plead to first-degree murder as
outlined on the record.
I telephoned Rowena Hcskins, reviewed that
with her, and she has given me authority to indicate to
the Court that she is in agreement with that plea
bargain and is satisfied that —
the family members —
represents —

on behalf of her and

that she has told me she

that the —

that being the wife of

Mr. Bray, another sister, and a child of Mr. Bray

—

that they are satisfied with a plea of guilty to this
offense and a commitment of a life sentence —

that

they are satisfied.
THE COURT:

All right.

Thank you, Mr.

Chamberlain.
MR. CHAMBERLAIN:
THE COURT:

Thank you.

I'd like the record to reflect that

prior to taking the bench here in the open courtroom,
all counsel and I discussed this proposed plea
bargain —

including Mr. Chamberlain —

so that

everyone was aware of what the proposal was about
before I took the bench.
Well, based upon the representations made,
I!m going to find that there is a factual basis upon
which the plea may be rested.

And I'm going to also

find that this plea is governed by the provisions of
the Alford decision —

Alford versus North Carolina.

And I'm going to accept it on both of those bases, and
I'm going to order the plea of guilty entered.
Recommendations regarding sentencing in
the matter?
MR. SHUMATE:

Your Honor, Mr. Smith would ask

the Court to allow him to waive the statutory time and
proceed with sentencing at this time rather than to
order the preparation of a presentence report, in view
of the nature of the plea and the circumstances of the
facts before the Court.
I don't think that the Court sentencing
alternatives are substantial at all, and we're prepared
to go forward with that at this time.
THE COURT:

All right.

Does the State have any

objection?
MR. KANELL:
THE COURT:

The State does not oppose that.
All right.

Mr. Smith, just so

you're clear on this, the law allows you two days
before you're sentenced and up to 20 .days for
sentencing.

And you have the right to take advantage

of that delay if you wish.
Your counsel's indicated that you want to
give up that right and be sentenced today; is that

21

right?
MR. SMITH:

Yes, sir.

THE COURT:

All right.

You realize that and

I've already told you that if I sentence you today,
it's going to be to the state prison for the rest of
your life.
Do ycu understand that?
MR. SMITH:

Yes, sir.

THE COURT:

And having that in mind, do you

still wish to waive your right to a delay?
MR. SMITH:

Yes, sir.

THE COURT:

All right.

The record will reflect

that waiver.
Does either counsel wish to present
anything before I impose sentence?
Mr. Shumate?
MR. SHUMATE:
THE COURT:

No, Your Honor.
Mr. Smith, do you wish to make a

statement in your own behalf before I impose sentence?
MR. SMITH:

I'm sorry for what happened.

wish, you know, if he could feel my apology.

I

I knew

that it can't bring him back, but I didn't mean to do
it.
THE COURT:

Anything else?

MR. SMITH:

That's it.

*ATTT.
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THE COURT:

Mr. Kanell, anything?

MR. KANELL:

Your Kcnor, pursuant to the plea

agreement, the State does not have any evidence of
aggravating circumstances to present, and the State
does not request the Court to sentence the defendant to
the death sentence.
THE COURT:

Does not request that?

MR. KANELL:
THE COURT:

Does not request that.
All right.

MR. KANELL:

The State requests the Court to

sentence the defendant to life in prison.
THE COURT:

Anything else?
I!11 submit it, Your Honor.

MR. SHUMATE:
THE COURT:

All right.

Tracy Eugene Smith,

having been convicted by your own plea of the offense
of murder in the first-degree, a capital offense, in
violation of the laws of the State of Utah, I now
sentence you to the Utah State Prison for the rest of
your natural life.
Ifm also going to make a recommendation to
the board of pardons, which I would like included in
the order, that Mr. Smith serve 20 years before he's
considered to be released from the Utah State Prison.
Anything else?
MR. SHUMATE:

No, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

Mr. Kanell, will you prepare the

commitment papers and the judgment?
MR. KANELL;

Would you like —

would it be

appropriate to indicate in the order that a firearm was
used in the commission of the offense?
6

THE COURT:

Well, there hasn't been a plea taken

7

to that, but I think the factual basis, as we stated

8

it, is clear.
Perhaps what I would prefer you do is

9
0

obtain a copy of the transcript of today's proceedings,

1

and you may attach that, if you wish, when we send it
up to the board of pardons•

3

MR. KANELL:

14

THE COURT:

15

Okay.

All right.

Anything else to be

taken care of?

6

MR. SHUMATE:

7

THE COURT:

S
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Thank you.

No, Your Honor.

Thank you.

Good luck, Mr. Smith.

I need to inform you of one other matter,
Mr. Smith.

You have the right to appeal the decisions

run today.

If you want to appeal, you have to file

20
21

notice of your intent to appeal with the clerk within
20 days of today's date.

If you fail to do that, you

lose your right to appeal.
Do you understand your right to appeal?

PAUL G. MCMULLIN, CSR, RPR

MR. SMITH:

Yas, sir.

THE COURT:

All right.

Good luck.

(Whereupon the proceedings in the
4|
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above-entitled matter were concluded.)

C E R T I F I C A T E
STATE OF UTAH

)
) S3 •

COUNTY OF WASHINGTON )
I, PAUL G. MCMULLIN, CSR, RPR, a Notary
Public, in and for the County of Washington, State of
Utah, do hereby certify:
That, the foregoing matter, to wit,
STATE OF UTAH VS. TRACY EUGENE SMITH, CRIMINAL NO. 631,
was taken down by me in shorthand at the time and place
therein named and thereafter reduced to computerized
transcription under my direction.
I further testify that I am not interested
in the event of the action.
WITNESS my hand and seal this 23rd day of
December, 1988.

PAUL G. MCMULLIN, CSR, RPR
/*' *%

RESIDING AT: St. George, Utah
<

^

MY COMMISSION EXPIRES: 6-17-91

PAUL G. MCMULLIN, CSR, RPR

IF D mil)
NOV 2!. 1983

LEO G. KANELL
Beaver County Attorney
Attorney for Plaintiff
P. 0. Box 471
Beaver, Utah 84713
Telephone: (801) 438-2351

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BEAVER, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff,

JUDGMENT, SENTENCE,
AND COMMITMENT

:

vs*
TRACY EUGENE SMITH,

:

Defendant

:

The

above

entitled

Crim. No, 631

matter

having

come

on

for

arraignment before the Court on the 14th day of November, 1988,
and

the

Defendant,

TRACY

EUGENE

SMITH,

being

present

and

represented by JAMES L, SHUMATE, and Plaintiff being represented
by LEO G. KANELL, Beaver County Attorney, and said Defendant
having plead guilty to the crime of MURDER IN THE FIRST DEGREE, a
capital

offense,

the

Defendant

having

additional time before sentencing and

waived

his

requesting

right

to

that he be

sentenced immediately and the court having conducted sentencing
proceedings

in

accordance

with

Section

76-3-207, Utah

Code

Annotated, as amended, 1953, the Defendant's attorney having

made statements to the Court regarding sentence and the Defendant
making a statement on his own behalf, the State of Utah not
requesting the Death penalty and not submitting any evidence in
aggravation of the penalty, the Court being fully advised in the
premises, now makes and enters the following Judgment, Sentence
and Commitment.
JUDGMENT
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the
Defendant, TRACY EUGENE SMITH, is guilty of the offense of MURDER
IN THE FIRST

DEGREE, a capital

Information

in

violation

offense, as

of

Sections

charged

in the

76-5-201

and

76-5-202 (1) (d) Utah Code Annotated, as amended, 1953,
SENTENCE
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the
Defendant, TRACY EUGENE SMITH, is hereby sentenced to a term of
incarceration for his natural life in the Utah State Prison.

In

addition

be

the

court

recommends

that

the

Defendant

not

allowed parole or even be considered for parole until he has
served at least Twenty (20) years.
DATED this £2- - day of November, 1988.

PHILIP EVES
istrict Ccfeurt Judge
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COMMITMENT
The person of said Defendant, TRACY EUGENE SMITH, is
hereby

committed

to

the

custody

of

the

Utah

Division

of

Corrections for the purpose of executing the foregoing Judgment,
Sentence, and Commitment and it is ordered that the Defendant be
delivered to the Utah State Prison for the execution of the said
Sentence.

J
DATED this # ^ ^ d a y of November, 1988.

J ^ PHILIP EVES
restrict Court Judge
CERTIFICATE
STATE OF UTAH

)
) ss.
COUNTY OF BEAVER )
I, Paul B. Barton, Clerk of said District Court of
Beaver County, State of Utah, do hereby certify that the
Honorable J, PHILIP EVES, whose name is subscribed to the
preceding certificate is the Judge of said Court, duly
commissioned and qualified, and that the signature of said Judge
to said certificate is genuine. ^ ^ B B B B B ^ ^ ^

